

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-15

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TRSE-00 EB-11 SY-10 DRC-01 SCEM-02 INT-08 COME-00

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R 171515Z SEP 73 ZFD

FM AMEMBASSY OSLO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7113

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

USMISSION NATO

USNMR SHAPE

USLO SACLANT

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 OSLO 3449

MILITARY ADDRESSEES ALSO FOR POLADS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, ENRG, NO, UR, SV

SUBJECT: VISIT OF SOVIET DEPUTY FORMIN TO NORWAY

1. SUMMARY: I DISCUSSED THE STATUS OF SOVIET-NORWEGIAN RELATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S UNDER SECRETARY SVENNEVIG BEFORE THE VISIT OF DEPUTY FORMIN ZEMSKOV TO OSLO (SEPTEMBER 4-7) AND WITH DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS VIBE AND FIFTH DIVISION (USSR AND EE) CHIEF MEVIK SINCE THE ZEMSKOV VISIT. IT WAS THE NORWEGIAN IMPRESSION THAT ZEMSKOV WAS NOT WELL PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES LIKE THE
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UNGA AGENDA AND CSCE, PART OF THE OSTENSIBLE REASON FOR

HIS VISIT. MUCH OF THE DISCUSSION REVOLVED AROUND BILATERAL RELATIONS, WITH PARTICULAR STRESS ON SPITZBERGEN (SVALBARD) WHERE A CUMULATION OF DIFFERENCES HAS CREATED SOME FRICTION. ZEMSKOV APPEARED AGREEABLE TO HOLDING SPECIAL TALKS TO RESOLVE THESE DIFFERENCES BUT THE NORWEGIANS ARE RESERVING JUDGMENT PENDING THE ACTUAL OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. SVENNEVIG EXPLAINED THAT ZEMSKOV HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN SCHEDULED TO COME IN JUNE IN PLACE OF GROMYKO WHO HAD BEEN INVITED TO VISIT NORWAY BUT KEPT EXCUSING HIMSELF. THE NORWEGIANS BELIEVE ZEMSKOV REPLACED SMIRNOV AS DEPUTY FORMIN FOR NORTH EUROPE BECAUSE SMIRNOV HAD AUTHORIZED THE ESPIONAGE EFFORT WHICH LED TO THE SCANDAL EARLIER THIS YEAR AND EXUPULSION OF TWO SOVIET EMBASSY EMPLOYEES WITHOUT RETALIATION. NORWEGIAN RECORDS CARRY ZEMSKOV AS ALSO LINKED TO INTELLIGENCE.

3. ZEMSKOV TOLD THE NORWEGIANS HE HAD BEEN ASKED TO USE HIS ORIENTATION VISIT FOR THE USUAL ANNUAL DISCUSSION OF THE UPCOMING UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION. VIBE GLOSSED OVER THIS DISCUSSION OF THE UNGA, SAYING THAT IT DID NOT ADD ANYTHING TO PREVIOUS KNOWLEDGE OF SOVIET POSITIONS.

4. ON CSCE, MEVIK DESCRIBED THE CONVERSATION AS ALMOST EMBARRASSING. ZEMSKOV CLAIMED THAT DEPUTY FORMIN KNOVOLEV WOULD BE HEADING THE DELEGATION TO THE GENEVA TALKS WHILE HE WOULD BE THE RESPONSIBLE POLICY OFFICIAL ON THE MOSCOW END. SINCE MEVIK IS TO HEAD THE NORWEGIAN DELEGATION, HE HAD PREPARED DETAILED BRIEFING PAPERS ASKING ZEMSKOV WHAT THE SOVIETS MEANT BY THEIR POSITION ON DIFFERENT ASPECTS E.G. OF THEIR DRAFT DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. SVENNEVIG DROPPED THE SUBJECT WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR ZEMSKOV COULD NOT ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS OF DETAIL. ON BASKET THREE, HE SEEMED BETTER BRIEFED; OUTSIDE THE CONFERENCE ROOM IN PARTICULAR HE STRESSED SOVIET INTEREST IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THIS QUESTION OF EAST-WEST CONTACTS BUT INSISTED THAT THE MEASURES PROPOSED MUST NOT BE SUBVERSIVE AND VIOLATE THE BASIC SPIRIT OF DETENTE.

5. DISCUSSION OF MBFR WAS ALSO QUITE GENERAL AND DISAPPOINTING.
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THE ONLY POINT OF SLIGHT INTEREST TO EMERGE WAS ZEMSKOV'S DESCRIPTION OF THE UPCOMING MEETINGS IN VIENNA AS "TALKS ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS."

6. THE MAIN THRUST OF THE CONVERSATION CONCERNED BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, IN PARTICULAR SVALBARD. THE NORWEGIANS HAVE BECOME CONCERNED OVER THE PROGRESSIVE EROSION OF THEIR SOVEREIGNTY ON SVALBARD DUE TO INADEQUATE LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE RESOURCES THERE AND THE SOVIET

ATTITUDE. SVENNEVIG DESCRIBED THE SOVIET APPROACH AS ESSENTIALLY ONE OF REQUESTING A SPECIAL STATUS ON SVALBARD, DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE OTHER SIGNATORIES TO THE 1920 TREATY. VIBE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS KEEP INSISTING THAT ONLY NORWAY AND THE USSR HAVE INTERESTS ON SVALBARD, AND THEY KEEP POINTING TO A 1947 STORTING RESOLUTION WHICH REFERRED TO MOSCOW'S "SPECIAL INTERESTS" THERE. (VIBE SAID THE RESOLUTION WAS INTENDED TO BE RESPONSIVE TO SOVIET PRESSURE BUT DID NOT GO BEYOND RECOGNIZING THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD SPECIAL INTERESTS BECAUSE OF THEIR COAL MINING OPERATIONS.)

7. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE PRINCIPLE AREAS OF CURRENT DIFFERENCE, MOST OF WHICH WERE DISCUSSED WITH ZEMSKOV:

A. AIRPORT AT HOTELLNESET. AGREEMENT ON THE NUMBER OF SOVIET PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED AT THE NEW AIRPORT IS ON THE WAY TOWARD RECONCILIATION. WITH MOSCOW PRESSING FOR EIGHT PERSONS AND THE NORWEGIANS FOUR, A COMPROMISE OF SIX IS IN SIGHT. WHILE THE SOVIETS ARE NO LONGER DEMANDING RADIO EQUIPMENT AND A TECHNICIAN IN THE CONTROL TOWER, THEY ARE ASKING FOR AN INTERPRETER TO HANDLE INCOMING SOVIET PLANES (WHICH VIBE FELT MIGHT BE WISE). LAST SPRING THE SOVIETS GAVE THE NORWEGIANS A DRAFT AIRPORT AGREEMENT WHOSE PREAMBLE RESTATED NORWAY'S OBLIGATION NOT TO USE SVALBARD FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. THE NORWEGIAN VIEW IS THAT THIS POSITION WAS REITERATED IN THEIR CIRCULAR NOTE ANNOUNCING PLANS TO CONSTRUCT THE AIRPORT WHICH THEY SENT TO ALL SIGNATORY POWERS OF THE 1920 TREATY ON SVALBARD, AND THEY ARE NOT EMPOWERED UNDER THAT TREATY TO SIGN SEPARATE BILATERAL AGREEMENT. SVENNEVIG EXPLAINED NORWAY HAD CONSULTED THE SOVIETS ORIGINALLY ONLY AS A COURTESY, GIVEN THE AMOUNT OF SOVIET TRAFFIC TO SVALBARD IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR COAL MINING OPERATION. BY AGREEMENT, THE NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS IS PRESENTLY DRAFTING A PURELY TECHNICAL AGREEMENT ON AIRPORT MANAGEMENT TO BE SIGNED BY THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS, HOPEFULLY LATER THIS YEAR. MEANWHILE, CONFIDENTIAL

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CONSTRUCTION ON THE AIRPORT CONTINUES. IT WILL NOT BE OPEN FOR PRELIMINARY SERVICE UNTIL THE END OF 1974 AND COMPLETED IN 1975.

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R 171515Z SEP 73 ZFD
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7116
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
USNMR SHAPE
USLO SACLANT
USCINCEUR

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B. ENVIRONMENT. MOSCOW PROTESTED NOWAY'S PROCLAMATION ON JULY 1 OF NEW REGULATIONS ON SVALBARD PRECLUDING DRILLING FOR OIL OR OTHER MINERALS IN NATIONAL PARK AREAS AND ACCESS TO SPECIAL RESERVATIONS SET ASIDE TO PRESERVE NATURE. THE SOVIETS ARGUED THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSULTED BEFORE SUCH REGULATIONS WERE ISSUED WHICH HAD THE EFFECT OF RESTRICTING THEIR FREE RIGHT OF ACCESS ON SVALBARD. THE NORWEGIANS REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD AS MUCH ACCESS AS ANY OF THE OTHER SIGNATORIES TO THE 1920 TREATY UNDER THESE REGULATIONS, BUT THIS DID NOT MEAN UNLIMITED ACCESS. MOREOVER, THE DRAFT REGULATIONS HAD BEEN GIVEN TO ALL GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS WITH INTERESTS ON SVALBARD; WHILE SEVERAL FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES COMMENTED ON THE REGULATIONS, THE SOVIET COAL MINING COMPANY ARKTIKUG

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SAID NOTHING.

C. CLAIM FEES. LAST YEAR NOWAY INCREASED IT FEE FOR SURVEYING CLAIMS FROM 500 TO 1500 KRONER, THE FIRST INCREASE SINCE 1925. MOSCOW ALONE REFUSES TO PAY.

D. RADIO EQUIPMENT. BECAUSE OF THE INCREASE IN FOREIGN

EXPEDITIONS EQUIPPED WITH SPECIAL RADIO TRANSMITTERS, NORWAY HAS BEGUN REQUIRING LICENSES FOR RADIO EQUIPMENT OF GEOLOGICAL EXPEDITIONS. THE SOVIETS REFUSE TO COOPERATE.

E. CAR LICENSES. OSLO IS NOW DETERMINED TO BEGIN LICENSING SOVIET CARS ON SVALBARD. SOVIET ACQUISITION OF NORWEGIAN VEHICLES LAST YEAR HAS STRENGTHENED THE NORWEGIAN HAND.

F. PERSONNEL. ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY CONTROL OVER THE NUMBER OF SOVIET PERSONNEL ON SVALBARD, VIBE SAID THERE CAN BE NONE UNDER THE 1920 TREATY. THE U.S. CAN ALSO BRING IN AS MANY AS IT WISHES. NORWAY HAS NOT EVEN MANAGED TO REGISTER DEATHS AND BIRTHS IN THE SOVIET COAL MINING COMMUNITY. ALL THIS IS HANDLED BY THE TWO MAN SOVIET CONSULATE GENERAL. SVENNEVIG IMPLIED HE HOPED THE AUTHORITIES ON SVALBARD WOULD TAKE STEPS TO REDUCE THE EXTRA-TERRITORIAL CHARACTER OF THE SOVIET MINING ENCLAVE.

8. OIL EXPLORATION. THE DECISION OF THE SOVIETS ON SVALBARD TO APPLY IN THE PAST MONTH FOR THE FIRST TIME FOR PERMISSION TO DRILL FOR OIL DRAWS ATTENTION TO A POTENTIALLY VERY SENSITIVE SUBJECT. VIBE SAID THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR ROMANOVSKY HAD HIM OUT TO LUNCH ABOUT

TWICE A MONTH AND KEEPS REMINDING HIM OF SOVIET CONCERN OVER THE IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENSIVE FOREIGN OIL EXPLORATION IN THE NORTH, INCLUDING SVALBARD. SVENNEVIG, ON THE OTHER HAND, DENIED A REPORT (GIVEN ME BY AN ITALIAN DIPLOMAT) ACCORDING TO WHICH NORWAY HAD PROMISED MOSCOW NOT TO ALLOW ANY MORE FOREIGN OIL COMPANIES TO PROSPECT FOR OIL ON SVALBARD. (THE SOVIETS DID APPARENTLY OBJECT TO CALTEX COOPERATING WITH NORSK FINA IN OIL DRILLING OPERATIONS. IT WOULD NOT BE SURPRISING IF THEY NOW TRIED TO DISCOURAGE THE NORWEGIANS FROM AGREEING TO LICENSE AN AMERICAN COMPANY WHICH WOULD LIKE TO MINE COAL NEAR THE SOVIET OPERATIONS. SEE OSLO'S A-208.) ACCORDING TO SVENNEVIG, THE SOVIETS HAVE NEVER OFFICIALLY RAISED THE SUBJECT
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OF DRILLING NORTH OF LATITUDE 62. THEIR KEY WORD IS PERHAPS "OFFICIALLY".

9. THAT THE SOVIETS ARE INTERESTED IN THE IMPLICATIONS OF NORWEGIAN OIL EXPLORATION IS QUITE CLEAR. SVENNEVIG REPORTED THEY HAD PROPOSED COOPERATION IN OIL EXPLORATION WITH NORSK HYDRO (NORWAY'S LARGE MAJORITY GOVERNMENT-OWNED CONGLOMERATE) ABOUT TWO YEARS AGO BUT WERE TURNED DOWN AND HAVE NOT REPEATED THE OFFER. ON HIS RECENT VISIT, ZEMSKOV VISITED NORWAY'S OIL CAPITAL STAVANGER WHERE HE MET WITH THE STATE OIL AND OIL DIRECTORATE OFFICIALS. (WE HAVE NO REPORT YET ON THIS ASPECT OF HIS VISIT.)

10. CONTINENTAL SHELF. NORWAY CONTINUES TO BE CONCERNED OVER THE LACK OF AGREEMENT WITH THE USSR REGARDING DEMARCATION OF THE

CONTINENTAL SHELF OFF THEIR COMMON NORTHERN BORDER. DISCUSSIONS BROKE DOWN IN 1970 WHEN THE SOVIETS PRESSED FOR MOVING THE LINE OF DEMARCATION FURTHER WEST THAN NORWAY COULD ACCEPT, ON THE GROUNDS OF THE USSR'S GREATER SIZE AND SECURITY NEEDS. VIBE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT HAD PROPOSED TO ZEMSKOV THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS BE RENEWED. THE QUESTION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF ON SVALBARD WAS APPARENTLY NOT DISCUSSED. (THE NORWEGIAN VIEW IS THAT SVALBARD IS A CONTINUATION OF THE NORWEGIAN CONTINENTAL SHELF, AND THE 1920 TREATY WOULD AUTHORIZE OFF-SHORE DRILLING BY SIGNATORY POWERS ONLY UP TO THE 4 MILE TERRITORIAL LIMIT. SHOULD THE TERRITORIAL LIMIT BE EXTENDED AT THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE, THIS WOULD, OF COURSE, MEAN MORE AREA FOR OFF-SHORE DRILLING).

11. VIBE REPORTED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS ON SVALBARD HAD TAKEN PLACE IN A GOOD ATMOSPHERE AND ZEMSKOV SEEMED AGREEABLE TO SENDING A SOVIET DELEGATION TO DISCUSS THE VARIOUS OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS. HE ALSO AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT A NEW ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO DELIMIT THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, BUT NOTED THAT THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES REMAINED QUITE FAR APART. VIBE SAID THE NORWEGIANS WERE ENCOURAGED BY ZEMSKOV'S GENERAL POSTURE, BUT HE ALSO INDICATED THEY HAVE HAD ENOUGH EXPERIENCE TO RESTRAIN THEIR ENTHUSIASM UNTIL THEY SEE THE COLOR OF THE RUBLES THE SOVIETS BRING WITH THEM WHEN THEY ACTUALLY BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS. NO DATE HAS YET BEEN SET FOR THE TALKS.
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